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market  prices.  Finally,  estimation  of  an  error correction  model  reveals  that  short run 
transmission of price signals from the world market to domestic producers has improved, 
such that domestic prices adjust faster today to world price fluctuations than they did 
prior to the reforms. However, there is some evidence of asymmetries in the way positive 
and negative world price changes are transmitted to domestic markets. 
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Coffee growers in developing countries receive a notoriously small share of the export 
price of green coffee, which often is explained with excessive government regulation of 
the domestic markets and market inefficiency. Producer price shares vary substantially 
across  countries,  even  when  comparing  countries  with  seemingly  similar  exporting 
systems. For example, producers in Tanzania received only 42% of the export price of 
arabica  coffee  and  30% of  the price  for  robusta in  1998/99  (Baffes,  2003),  while  in 
Uganda the share of export price accruing to growers of robusta at the same time was 
75% (ITF, 2002b).  
The governments of developing countries are known for intervening intensively in 
their  agricultural  markets  for  two  main  reasons.  One  is  revenue  collection,  since 
agriculture, often being the largest sector of the economy and the main export sector, 
represents an easy to monitor base for taxation. Another reason is reducing domestic 
price volatility with the view of lowering risks to producers that depend on the prices of 
export  crops  and  to  consumers  of  staple  foods,  which  constitute  a  large  part  of 
consumption of the poor. For their impact on producer welfare the stabilization schemes 
are in general regarded as unsuccessful. The cost of reduced volatility seemed too high, 
given that the administered prices usually were far below the certainty equivalent that 
would be accepted by farmers (see for example McIntire and Varangis, 1999). In other 
words, the gap between the producer and the world prices was higher than what farmers 
would be willing to pay to avoid risk. Inefficiency associated with stabilization policies 
was further exacerbated by prevalence of overstaffed and often corrupt marketing boards   3 
that were formed to execute the policies. In addition to fixing prices, the boards were 
directly involved in domestic marketing of commodities, controlling purchasing as well 
as exporting, in effect acting as a state monopsony vis à vis producers. 
Following structural adjustment reforms, most countries in Sub Saharan Africa 
and  Latin  America  implemented  substantial  liberalization  of  export  crop  markets, 
dissolving  marketing  boards  and  allowing  private  agents  to  operate  as  traders  and 
exporters.  Liberalization’s  pace  and  scope  varied  across  countries.  Most  countries 
undertook reforms of their coffee sectors at the end of the 1980s or beginning of the 
1990s by lowering export taxes and replacing state controlled marketing systems with 
markets run by private agents. The key objectives were the introduction of more efficient 
markets, lower marketing margins and higher producer prices.  
This paper addresses the question whether the reforms were successful in raising 
the share of the world market price received by growers and improving transmission of 
price  signals  from  the  world  to  domestic  markets  in  the  case  of  coffee.  An  error 
correction  model  is  specified  to  account  for  the  dynamic  nature  of  price  adjustment. 
Short run price transmission, the speed of adjustment and the equilibrium producer price 
share are estimated prior and after the reforms. Asymmetric price transmission is tested in 
both periods to check whether price increases are passed through to producers as fast as 
price decreases and whether the nature of the asymmetry has changed after the reforms.  
Several  previous  papers  investigate  the  responsiveness  of  domestic  prices  in 
developing countries to fluctuations on the world commodity markets. The evidence of 
the relationship between world market prices and domestic prices has been mixed. The   4 
estimates of the elasticity of transmission from border to domestic markets seem to be 
highly sensitive to the methodology applied.  
Hazell et. al. (1990) examine whether the volatility in the world market prices has 
been passed through to producer prices in developing countries. The authors test whether 
price instability has increased over time and whether fluctuations in domestic markets 
followed the variability of the world prices and find that world market prices indeed grew 
more volatile over time, but that price variation was explained more by declining average 
prices  than  by  absolute  variability.  The  fluctuations  in  world  market  prices  were  in 
general transmitted to countries’ export unit values, but not to producer prices, since the 
real exchange rates and government intervention in agriculture played a buffering role. In 
the case of coffee high correlation between producer prices and export prices is found, 
but  as  with  other  commodities  there  is  no  evidence  of  greater  integration  between 
domestic and export prices.   
Mundlak and Larson (1992) estimate a direct relationship between domestic and 
world market prices. Their estimates of price transmission elasticities for 58 countries are 
obtained by using a simple logarithmic specification of the relationship between internal 
and world market prices and the exchange rates. The authors find evidence of almost 
perfect price transmission. Cross commodity OLS for each country independently as well 
as between commodity and within commodity regressions suggest that for most countries 
the elasticity of transmission is close to unity. Separate estimations are carried out for 
wheat, coffee and cocoa. Price transmissions in those markets are found to be lower than   5 
those obtained from the pool of commodities, indicating that these particular markets are 
highly distorted. 
A different approach to estimating a relationship between two price time series is 
the  error correction  model.  Unlike  the  static  framework,  the  error correction  model 
includes a dynamic component, which captures the effect of adjustment of the dependent 
variable when it deviates from its long term equilibrium level. This approach was taken 
by Quiroz and Soto (1995), and their results differ substantially from the ones obtained 
by Mundlak and Larson. A dynamic econometric model is specified and estimated on a 
country by country  basis  for  78  countries  using  the  data  for  30  years  and  15 
commodities. The authors conclude unambiguously that in the vast majority of cases the 
international price signals are transmitted very poorly to domestic markets or are not 
transmitted at all.  
Baffes and Gardner (2003) also use the error correction model to estimate the 
responsiveness of the domestic prices to fluctuations on the world market. The authors 
analyze price transmissions for 10 commodities on a country by country basis for the 
period  mid  1970s  to  mid  1990s.  Again,  estimation  of  price  adjustment  suggests  that 
changes in the world prices account for only a small share of the variation in domestic 
prices.  Taking  one  step  further,  the  authors  assess  whether  policy  reforms  under  the 
structural  adjustment  programs  improved  price  transmission.  Structural  breaks  are 
introduced corresponding to the years of substantial market reforms. The results show 
that in most countries the reforms had very limited effect on price transmission.   6 
Morisset (1997) examines in more detail the growing spread between world and 
domestic  commodity  prices  in  the  consuming  countries  and  evaluates  the  losses  to 
developing countries caused by this spread. He finds that the gap has widened over time 
because  of  the  asymmetric  response  of  consumer  prices  to  movements  in  the  world 
prices.  Throughout  the period  examined,  the  increases  in  the  world prices  have been 
passed through to consumers more fully than price decreases, causing a loss of over $100 
billion a year in export earnings for developing countries. Coffee is the sector which is 
characterized  by  the  greatest  price  asymmetry.  Apart  from  fuels,  coffee  is  also  the 
commodity which bears the greatest losses associated with the increasing price spread 
between the world prices and the domestic consumer prices.  
This  article  focuses  exclusively  on  the  coffee  sector  and  measures  the 
responsiveness of the domestic producer prices to the international prices, leaving the 
markets  in  the  consuming  countries  out  of  the picture.  The  major  assumption  is that 
exporting countries act as price takers on the world market. For the period following the 
collapse of the International Coffee Agreement (ICA) in 1989 this is not an unreasonable 
assumption.  Even  during  the  ICA  regulatory  system,  the  difficulties  associated  with 
negotiating  and  insuring  compliance  with  the  agreements  suggested  that  in  fact  the 
producing countries were not able to collude perfectly, making the agreement ineffective. 
Karp  and  Perloff  (1993)  test  the  price taking  hypothesis  in  the  case  of  Brazil  and 
Colombia, the two largest exporters. A dynamic feedback oligopoly model is estimated 
and  the  conclusion  is  that  Brazil  and  Colombia  are  closer  to  price  taking  than  to 
collusion.   7 
This article follows the dynamic approach adopted by Quiroz and Soto (1995) and 
Baffes and Gardner (2003) and also incorporates asymmetric price transmissions. The 
principal question that the article addresses is whether the reform processes in the coffee 
producing countries resulted in a closer relationship between the world market prices and 
the internal prices paid to growers. The model allows us to estimate whether the short run 
price transmission, the speed of adjustment and the target share of the domestic price 
have  changed  after  the  reforms.  Another  question  is  the  existence  of  asymmetric 
responses to world price increases and decreases. If prior to liberalization neither price 
increases nor price decreases were fully transmitted to producers, an interesting question 
is whether the reforms equally affected the transmission of the upward and downward 
price movements to domestic markets.  
The coffee market reforms 
Each country followed its own distinct liberalization path. The degree of liberalization, 
the  timing  and  the  sequencing  of  the  reforms  were  different  in  each  particular  case, 
producing different outcomes in different countries. The main components of the reforms 
by  country  are  summarized  in  table  1.  Four  groups  of  countries  can  be  identified 
describing the scope of the reforms. In many countries the reforms covered the full range 
of measures: complete withdrawal of the state from marketing, facilitation of entry of 
private  traders,  abolishment  of  minimum  prices,  lower  export  taxes  and  simpler 
procedures for firm registration and licensing. This category includes Brazil, Mexico, 
India, Uganda, Madagascar, Togo, Cameroon and Ghana.    8 
The second group covers the countries, where some reforms took place, but the 
government  retains  substantial  power  over  marketing,  and  the  sector  continues  to  be 
heavily regulated. In Kenya and Tanzania the parastatal organizations are not officially 
involved in marketing, but the mandatory auctions are still in place, meaning that no 
coffee can be traded outside the system. The Coffee Board of Kenya (CBK) remains 
highly influential, and the Kenya Coffee Growers and Employers Association (KCGEA) 
has called for its dissolution, demanding direct marketing of coffee by the growers to be 
permitted (East African Standard, 2003).  In Tanzania, a large proportion of coffee is 
marketed by cooperative unions which maintain close ties to the Coffee Board and enjoy 
special protection. The licensing procedures for coffee traders are overly restrictive and 
in 2000/2001 the Coffee Board revoked the buying licenses of private traders, effectively 
handing the monopsony power to the unions (Baffes, 2003).  
In  other  countries,  such  as  Ethiopia,  Angola  and  Central  African  Republic, 
internal marketing is liberalized, but the government maintains some level of control over 
the  producer  prices.  The  Angolan  National  Coffee  Institute  announces  the  minimum 
prices to producers at the beginning of each season. In Ethiopia the minimum export 
differentials  are  set  daily,  but  there  is  no  floor  producer  price.  In  Central  African 
Republic the prices are indicative and are used as the basis for negotiations.  
Finally,  in  the  case  of  Colombia,  the  reforms  of  the  coffee  sector  were  very 
limited. The Federación Nacional de Cafeteros (FNC) continues to be the most powerful 
player  on  the  market,  controlling  both  domestic  marketing  and  exporting  and  fixing 
grower prices and marketing margins.    9 
The contents and the achievements of the reforms in each country are described in 
more  detail  in  Appendix  A.  To  get  a  preliminary  idea  of  how  the  reforms  affected 
producer prices, the shares of the domestic prices in the world prices before and after the 
reforms are shown in figure 1. As expected, in almost all countries the producer price 
share seems to be larger after the reforms. The two exceptions are Angola and Tanzania 
(in the case of arabica coffee). In Angola, in the whole period 1983 1990 the producer 
prices changed only twice, so when the world coffee prices started dropping in 1989, the 
local prices in Angola were kept artificially high, exceeding the world prices by over 
50%. As a result, for the pre reform period on the whole, the average producer prices 
were close to 100% of the world robusta prices. Post reform prices vary more often. 
Although the minimum prices are still fixed, they change far more frequently than before, 
reflecting to some degree fluctuations in the world coffee market. In Tanzania, the price 
share for arabica coffee decreased slightly, whereas the price share for robusta increased. 
This could potentially be due to the fact that the quality of the Tanzanian coffee has been 
decreasing in the last years. The data on coffee export by coffee class in Ponte (2001) 
shows that the quality has been declining steadily since 1995/1996. In all other countries 
the producer price share increased substantially, in particular in Brazil, Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Mexico, Madagascar and Uganda. Remarkably, in the latter the price share increased by 
almost 50 percentage points following the liberalization. 
The model 
To  test  for  cointegration  between  domestic  and  world  prices,  an  error correction 
specification can be used, following Engle and Granger (1987). Error correction models   10 
incorporate  dynamic  elements  into  estimation  of  price  transmission,  allowing  the 
domestic prices to adjust to their long term equilibrium in the period following a change 
in the world price.  
Take an autoregressive distributed lag model ARDL(1,1), which includes lagged values 
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Equation  (2)  describes  the  variation  of  the  domestic  price  p
d  in  terms  of  its 
reaction  to  fluctuations  in  the  world  price  p
w  and  adjustment  to  own  long term 
equilibrium. δ captures the immediate responsiveness of the domestic prices to changes in 
the  world  price,  and  θ  is  the  ‘error correction’  term,  which  measures  the  speed  of 
adjustment of p
d to its long run equilibrium γp
w.  
To  capture  both  the  impact  of  the  reforms  on  the  parameters  and  to  test  for 
asymmetric price transmission, two sets of dummies are used. One is a set of policy 
dummies,  
reform after period a indicates t if











The other is a set of dummies that describes whether a price increase or price 

















where  1 − − =   t t t p p p . 
The policy dummies were interacted with all the independent variables and the 
dummies  that  denote  the  sign  of  the price  change  were  interacted with  the  short run 
elasticity  of  transmission  δ  to  test  for  the  presence  of  asymmetric  short run  price 
transmission. 
For the error correction model to be valid, we first need to insure that the time 
series used in the estimation are stationary. The stationarity properties of the price time 
series (both levels and first differences) are tested using the Augmented Dickey Fuller 
procedure  (ADF).  In  each  case  the  hypothesis  tested  is  that  the  time  series  follow  a 
nonstationary process with a unit root. Rejecting the null hypothesis allows treating the 
time  series  as  stationary.  In  addition,  the  existence  of  a  long term  cointegrating 
relationship between the world and the domestic prices is tested, in order to check the 
validity of the error correction part of equation (2). The basic model without a structural 
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The constant is restricted to be zero, so that γ can be interpreted directly as the 
share of producer prices in world market prices. Three OLS regressions are estimated: 
separate regressions before and after the reforms and a pooled regression with a structural 
break.  The  latter  model  allows  estimation  of  two  different  slope  coefficients  while 
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In each case an ADF test on the residuals is performed to determine whether the 
OLS results adequately describe the cointegrating relationship between p
d and p
w. The 
residuals  t ν ˆ from the pooled regression (4) are then used to estimate the error correction 
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All prices used in estimation are in current US dollars. The implicit assumption in 
the model is that the changes in the countries’ exchange rates immediately translate into 
changes in domestic prices in local currencies, so that the price of coffee in US dollars in 
unaffected by currency fluctuations. In other words, perfect transmission of exchange 
rates to domestic prices is assumed. 
The δs describe the short term responsiveness of the domestic prices to world 
price increases and decreases before and after the reforms. The θs are the parameters 
capturing the pre  and post reform speed of adjustment to the long term equilibrium in 
domestic prices. The estimated coefficients can be used to calculate how long it will take 
the domestic prices to fully adjust to a one time change in the world price. The degree of 
adjustment of the domestic price relative to full adjustment n periods after the change in 
the world price equals 
,
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For derivation see Appendix B.   
The data 
The data for this exercise are monthly world market prices and prices paid to producers in 
approximately  20  coffee  exporting  countries  for  the  past  20  years  collected  by  the 
International Coffee Organization (ICO). Prices paid to growers are the farmgate prices 
reported to ICO by the national coffee authorities and constitute the average of all grades 
purchased from the farmers. The exchange rates used by the ICO to convert the prices in 
local currencies to US cents are the monthly average exchange rates published by the 
IMF. 
Prices received by the exporting countries for their coffee on the world market 
vary depending on the coffee type exported. The ”indicator prices” are calculated by the 
ICO on the basis of the daily spot prices of the relevant types coffee traded in the New 
York  and  Bremen/Hamburg  markets.  The  ICO  prices  distinguish  between  four  main 
groups  of  coffee:  Colombian  milds,  Brazilian  milds,  other  milds  robustas.  The  main 
exporters of each type of coffee are listed in table 2. In the country by country analysis 
the price of the appropriate coffee type is used as the world market price.  
The estimation results 
The results of the stationarity tests conducted for the price variables are reported in tables 
3 and 4. The properties of each price time series are analyzed first. In all cases, except 
Ghana and to a smaller degree Tanzania, the ADF test does not reject the null hypothesis 
that the price time series follow a unit root process. However, testing the same hypothesis   14 
for  first  differences  allows  us  to  reject  the  unit  root  hypothesis  at  1%  level  for  all 
countries. This leads us to conclusion that price differentials can be used in the error 
correction model.  
Turning to the long term cointegration between the domestic and the world prices 
we note that for most countries we cannot reject the hypothesis of no cointegration before 
the  reforms,  which  is  consistent  with  our  expectations.  Given  the  high  degree  of 
government intervention in the sector prior to liberalization we can expect the domestic 
prices to be driven by policy decisions, rather than by the world market prices. After the 
reforms cointegration is detected in some countries: In almost half of the cases the null of 
the residuals following a unit root process was rejected at 5% level of significance. In the 
pooled  model  with  structural  breaks  the  null  of  no  cointgration  is  rejected  at  10% 
significance  in  9  countries  out  of  14.  The  exceptions  are  Colombia,  Togo,  Angola, 
Cameroon  and  Central  African  Republic.  In  all  these  countries,  except  Angola,  a 
cointegrating relationship was found in the period after the reforms. 
The  estimates  of  the  pre   and  post liberalization  shares  of  producer  prices  in 
world  prices  are  reported  in  table  5,  together  with  the  results  of  the  error correction 
model. For countries where the model with a structural break failed to reject the null of 
no  cointegration,  only  the  results  of  the post liberalization  error correction  model  are 
reported. Since in Angola no long run cointegration was detected in any of the three 
models no error correction model is estimated for Angola. The conclusion in this case is 
simply that the reforms did not produce greater integration of domestic and world prices, 
and therefore the Angolan coffee prices remain isolated from the international prices.    15 
In nearly countries the reforms significantly increased the target share of producer 
prices  in  the  world  prices.  The  only  exception  is  Tanzania,  where  the  price  share 
decreased from 0.56 to 0.53, although the difference is significant only at 10%. In other 
countries the share increased dramatically. For example, in Uganda the target share in the 
world market price increased from 0.32 to 0.91 and in Ethiopia it grew from 0.40 to 0.73. 
In India, both arabica and robusta growers received around 0.56 of the world price earlier 
– now the share has increased to 0.69 and 0.85, respectively. 
Short term transmission has either remained unchanged or improved in all cases, 
most  notably  in  Kenya,  Tanzania,  India  and  Uganda,  where  prior  to  the  reforms  the 
transmission  was  close  to  zero  and  increased  considerably  after.  Post liberalization 
transmission  varied  across  countries  and  in  some  cases  was  very  high,  implying  that 
domestic prices adjust almost immediately to the new equilibrium. Asymmetric short run 
price transmission did not seem to be a big issue at play, but there are a few interesting 
cases. In Kenya the transmission of both price increases and price decreases changed 
from zero to positive values after liberalization, but the negative price changes are now 
transmitted  faster  to  growers  than  the  positive  changes.  While  farmgate  prices  only 
increase by 40 cents as world prices go up 1 dollar, price decreases are passed through 
one to one, placing the full burden of falling coffee prices on growers. In Madagascar, 
where price transmission improved for price decreases, price increases are today passed 
through with a negative sign, leading to a surprising conclusion that producer prices fall 
in  the  short run  in  both  cases  –  when  the  world  market  price  increases  and  when  it 
decreases. A similar situation is observed in post reform Cameroon, where no short term   16 
transmission  of  price  decreases  was  found,  but  price  increases  lead  to  immediate 
downward changes in producer prices. There are no cases where prices increases were 
transmitted more fully than price decreases.  
To better understand how the transmission of price decreases changed relative to 
the  transmission  of  price  increases,  a  measure  of  the  net  change  is  constructed  and 
presented in table 5. In five out of nine countries, for which the error correction model 
was estimated, the transmission of price decreases went up by more than the transmission 
of  price  increases.  These  countries  are  Ethiopia,  Kenya,  Mexico,  Uganda  and 
Madagascar. While previously all price movements were transmitted poorly to producers 
in these countries, the liberalization made the pass through of the negative price changes 
easier than the transmission of the positive changes. Out of the countries mentioned, only 
in Kenya the change was significantly greater for price decreases than for price increases 
at  10%  significance.  This  simple  calculation  of  the  relative  changes  illustrates, 
nevertheless, that the reforms may have had an uneven impact on positive and negative 
price transmissions.  
The speed of adjustment improved in many cases, increasing from zero to around 
0.2 in Ethiopia, Kenya and Tanzania. It did not improve significantly in Brazil or in 
Mexico, probably because the scope of the reforms in these countries was limited given 
the initial conditions that were less restrictive than in the African countries.     
No  conclusions  can  be  drawn  regarding  the  reform induced  changes  in  price 
transmission and price shares in the countries, where no long term cointegration between 
the world market and the domestic market was found. In Colombia, Togo, Cameroon and   17 
Central African Republic cointegration was detected after the reforms, but not during the 
whole period considered. However, both the price transmission and the producer price 
share after the reforms was higher in Colombia than in the three African economies. This 
is consistent with the expectation that in a country where producers are organized and 
pursue their interests collectively, as it is the case in Colombia, grower price shares will 
in general be higher than in other countries.  
To understand how the reforms affected the speed at which the domestic prices 
react to changes in the world prices, it is useful to calculate the degree of adjustment of 
the internal price to a one time change in the world price. The results for adjustment 6 
and 12 months after the change in the world price are reported in table 6 and table 7. In 
the majority of the countries prices adjust faster today to changes in world market prices 
than  they  used  to.  In  Ethiopia,  Tanzania,  India,  Uganda  and  Kenya  the  degree  of 
adjustment after six months has increased drastically from less than half to around 90% 
and higher. In Brazil and Mexico, on the other hand, the adjustment is slower now than 
prior to change in policy. Note that in Brazil before the liberalization the domestic prices 
were overshooting following the change in the world price, since the immediate response 
parameter δ1 and δ2 were higher than the target price share γ1, especially for robusta 
coffee.  In  all  three  cases  where  asymmetric  price  transmission  was  detected  (Kenya, 
Madagascar  and  Cameroon),  price  increases  are  transmitted  slower  today  than  price 
decreases.  Moreover,  in  Madagascar  the  domestic  prices  adjust  faster  to  world  price 
decreases now relative to the period before the reforms, but adjustment to price increases 
is slower.    18 
Discussion 
In nine out of 14 countries investigated the grower prices were integrated with the world 
market prices in the longrun. In the remaining countries (except Angola) a cointegrating 
relationship between the price series was detected in the post reform period only. The 
short run  transmission  improved  in  almost  all  cases  where  the  comparison  of  the 
coefficients  before  and  after  the  reforms  was  possible.  In  other  cases  (Mexico, 
Madagascar  and  Ghana)  the  changes  were  not  significant.  The  speed  of  adjustment 
increased in all countries, except Brazil, Mexico and Uganda. 
In general, the greatest impact of the reforms was detected in countries where the 
liberalization was complete, leading to full withdrawal of parastatals from marketing, 
significantly simplified procedures for export licensing and a surge of private traders into 
the  market.  For  example,  in  Uganda  the  liberalization  process  covered  the  whole 
marketing chain from farm purchasing to exporting. Traders are now free to negotiate 
their own overseas contract  and payments are passed quickly to  coffee  growers. The 
result  is  almost  tripling  of  the  target  producer  price  share  and  large  and  significant 
improvement in the immediate transmission of the world market signals. Less striking but 
equally  important  results  were  achieved  in  India  and  Brazil  –  both  countries  with 
substantial reforms involving a switch from state trading to a market based system. The 
changes were tremendous in Kenya and Ethiopia as well, although in these countries the 
reforms were more limited. In Mexico, where the starting point was a less restrictive 
system, the reforms increased the target share of grower prices, but did not influence the 
price transmission significantly.     19 
In some countries several important reforms took place, but they were less far 
reaching or happened more gradually than in the cases described above. In Tanzania, 
cooperative unions, which were controlled by the coffee board prior to the reforms, still 
account for a large share of trade. The Tanzania Coffee Board runs the obligatory coffee 
auction. The coffee sales taxes are quite high and their structure is complicated. The taxes 
have been increasing in the last couple of  years. All this combined, in particular the 
increase in taxes, could have an impact on the reform outcome. Tanzania is the only 
country where the target share of grower prices in world market prices didn’t increase 
following the liberalization. 
In Colombia no structural reforms occurred, only the domestic pricing mechanism 
was changed slightly. The FNC, which was founded in 1927, remains the most dominant 
player in the market and fixes grower prices. This fact puts restraints on the integration 
between  the  domestic  and  the  world  market  prices.  Subsequently  no  long term 
cointegration in a model with structural break was found in Colombia. However in the 
period 1995 2002 grower prices were cointegrated with the world prices, indicating that 
the long run relationship between the internal and the international prices has improved. 
Similarly, in a number of the African countries (Togo, Cameroon and Central 
African Republic) no cointegrating relationship between the price time series was found 
during the whole period considered, but cointegration existed in the post reform period. 
This means that we cannot reliably estimate an error correction model with a structural 
break, and it is therefore not possible to compare the coefficients of price transmission 
and producer price shares before and  after the  reforms. However,  given that the null   20 
hypothesis of no cointegration between the local and the world prices can not be rejected 
in the pre reform period, but is rejected when only post reform years are considered, the 
conclusion is  that the reforms were successful in creating greater linkages between the 
internal and the external prices. 
Lastly,  in  the  case  of  Angola,  where  the  reforms  had  no  impact  on  the 
cointegration between the domestic and the world prices, it is clear that the reforms have 
not been far reaching enough to produce a lasting result. The domestic prices are still 
fixed  by  the  government,  providing  little  incentives  for  private  traders  to  enter  the 
market.  Moreover,  many  remote  markets  are  disrupted  because  of  the  war  and  the 
infrastructure has been destroyed, cutting off some of the coffee growing areas. 
Conclusions 
With the help of the cointegration analysis and an error correction model, this article 
examined  price  transmission  from  the  world  coffee  market  to  local  markets  in  the 
producing countries before and after sector reforms. In addition, the impact of the policy 
changes on the share of grower prices in world prices was estimated. The results show 
that the share of producer prices in the world price has increased substantially in all 
countries  except  one.  There  is  greater  integration  between  the  domestic  and  world 
markets today than prior to the reforms, and the transmission of world price signals has 
improved in most cases.  
The impact of the liberalization process seems to have been limited if the reforms 
were incomplete. Administered producer prices, continuing government involvement in 
marketing and lack of private initiative in trading appear to be detrimental to greater   21 
integration and higher domestic prices. When the government sets the floor prices in the 
post reform period, the prices tend to stay at the minimum, and upward movements in the 
world market price are not passed through to growers. A possible explanation is that 
excessive  regulation  discourages  entry  of  private  traders,  which  in  turn  curtails 
competition and obstructs upward movements of the grower prices when the world price 
is high. However, even with many traders operating on the market, the positive effect of 
liberalization on producer prices may be undermined if the traders engage in collusive 
behavior.  
Finally it should be noted that greater price transmission of world market prices 
may in fact work to the disadvantage of producers in the short run. With world market 
prices on a steady decline since the end of 1990s, fixed domestic prices at a pre crisis 
level would have been preferred by the producers. Moreover, this study shows that in 
some  cases  the  impact  of  the  reforms  on  price  transmission  has  been  somewhat 
asymmetric – the transmission has risen more for price decreases than for price increases 
in some countries, meaning that the growers now bear the full costs of price drops, while 
the  transmission  of  the positive price  shocks  has  not  changed  much.  A  greater pass 
through of prices changes at the time of falling prices is unfavorable to producers who 
may lack resources to cope with price risks. In many post reform systems the coffee 
growers  are  left  entirely  uninsured  against  low  prices.  Artificially  high  government 
supported producer prices are, however, unsustainable in the long run because of the 
large public outlays such support schemes would require. An alternative approach would 
be giving growers access to price risk management instruments, such as an opportunity to   22 
buy futures and option contracts or offer them private insurance that would shield them 
against price falls. This approach is consistent with the recent initiatives by the World 
Bank to help the coffee authorities in the exporting countries to apply risk management 
techniques. Pilot price insurance schemes have been launched in several countries and 
more  are  expected  to  be  initiated  in  the  near  future  (See,  for  example,  ITF(2002a), 
ITF(2002b), ITF(2002c) and Varangis et. al. (2003)).   23 
References 
Baffes, J., (2003), Tanzania’s coffee sector: Constraints and challenges in a global 
environment, The World Bank Africa Working Paper Series, 54  
Baffes, J. and B. Gardner, (2003), The transmission of world commodity prices to 
domestic markets under policy reforms in developing countries, Journal of Policy 
Reform, vol. 6, issue 3: 159 80 
East African Standard on line edition, (2003), “Dissolve coffee Board – KCGEA”, July 
5, 2003 http://www.eastandard.net 
Engle, R. F. and C. W. J. Granger, (1987), Co Integration and Error Correction: 
Representation, Estimation, and Testing, Econometrica, Vol. 55, No. 2: 251 276 
International Coffee Organization (ICO) Country Profiles, http://www.ico.org 
International Task Force on Commodity Risk Management in Developing Countries 
(ITF), Country and Commodity Profiles, http://www.itf commrisk.org/ 
International Task Force on Commodity Risk Management in Developing Countries 
(ITF), (2002a), Mexico: Coffee price risk management, Phase II report 
International Task Force on Commodity Risk Management in Developing Countries 
(ITF), (2002b), Uganda: Coffee price risk management, Phase II report   24 
International Task Force on Commodity Risk Management in Developing Countries 
(ITF), (2002c), Review of the Cameroon coffee sector for a producer price insurance 
project 
Karp, L.S. and J.M. Perloff, (1993), A dynamic model of oligopoly in the coffee export 
market, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 75: 448 457 
McIntire, J. and P. Varangis, (1999), Reforming Côte D'Ivoire Cocoa Marketing and 
Pricing System, The World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, 2081  
Morisset, J., (1997), Unfair Trade? Empirical evidence in world commodity markets over 
the past 25 years, The World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, 1815 
Mundlak Y. and D.F. Larson, (1992), On the transmission of world agricultural prices, 
The World Bank Economic Review, Vol. 6 No. 3: 399 422 
Ponte, S., (2001), Coffee Markets in East Africa: Local Responses to Global Challenges 
or Global Responses to Local Challenges?, Working Paper 01.5, Centre for Development 
Research, Copenhagen 
Quiroz, J. and R. Soto, (1995), International price signals in agricultural prices: Do 
governments care?, unpublished paper 
Varangis, P., P. Siegel, D. Giovannucci, and B. Lewin, (2003), Dealing with the coffee 





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   26 
table 2   Coffee exports by country, shares 
March 2003 to February 2004 
              
Colombian Milds  14.1%   Robustas  34.4% 
   Colombia  12.4%      Vietnam  14.4% 
   Kenya  1.0%      Indonesia  5.0% 
   Tanzania  0.7%      Uganda  2.6% 
         Côte D'Ivoire  2.7% 
Other Milds  24.2%      Cameroon  0.9% 
   Guatemala  4.4%      Madagascar  0.2% 
   Mexico  3.1%      Togo  0.1% 
   Honduras  3.0%      Central African Republic  0.04% 
   Peru  2.9%      Ghana  0.02% 
   India  1.7%      Angola  0.02% 
   Other  9.1%      Other  8.3% 
         
Brazilian Naturals  27.3%      
   Brazil  24.7%      
   Ethiopia  2.6%       
         
TOTAL        100% 
              
 
Source: International Coffee Organization  27 
table 3   Stationarity of the domestic and the world prices 
Augmented Dickey Fuller Test (without trend)
1 
                 
  ADF statistic 
    Price level  First differential 
ICO indicator prices       
  Brazilian naturals   2.11    6.42 *** 
  Colombian milds   2.09    6.52 *** 
  Other mild arabica   2.26    5.84 *** 
  Robustas   1.61    5.68 *** 
Producer prices         
  Brazil arabica   2.48    6.60 *** 
  Brazil robusta   1.77    5.80 *** 
  Ethiopia   2.20    6.78 *** 
  Kenya   2.22    8.02 *** 
  Tanzania arabica   2.76 *   5.75 *** 
  Tanzania robusta   1.83    5.82 *** 
  Colombia   1.86    5.21 *** 
  India arabica   2.31    5.72 *** 
  India robusta  1.57   5.09 *** 
  Mexico   2.12    6.08 *** 
  Uganda   2.17    7.46 *** 
  Madagascar   1.09    6.77 *** 
  Togo   2.12    5.33 *** 
  Angola   0.05    8.44 *** 
  Cameroon   1.53    6.61 *** 
  Central African Republic   1.59    5.70 *** 
  Ghana   5.18 ***   5.36 *** 
               
*   Null of unit root rejected at 10% significance, ** 5% significance, *** 1% significance
1 ; 6 months lag  28 
table 4   Cointegration between the domestic and the world prices 
Augmented Dickey Fuller Test (without trend)
1 
 
                          
    ADF statistic 
 
Reform year 
  Before    After    With structural break 
                         
               
Brazil arabica  1990     1.74    2.11    3.22 ** 
Brazil robusta  1990     1.60    2.52    3.28 ** 
Ethiopia arabica  1992    0.11    3.59 ***   3.15 ** 
Kenya arabica  1993     1.95    4.35 ***   4.96 *** 
Tanzania arabica  1994     2.85 *   2.83 *   3.78 *** 
Tanzania robusta  1994     2.51    1.92    2.28  
Colombia arabica  1995     1.78    3.43 **   2.50  
India arabica  1996     2.66 *   4.23 ***   3.42 ** 
India robusta  1996     2.59 *   3.40 **   3.21 ** 
Mexico arabica  1993     2.10    2.58 *   3.53 *** 
Uganda robusta  1992     2.76 *   2.10    3.67 *** 
Madagascar robusta  1988     1.35    3.24 **   3.82 *** 
Togo robusta  1996     1.67    4.27 ***   2.56  
Angola robusta  1991     0.58    2.45    1.89  
Cameroon robusta  1995     1.23    3.32 **   2.20  
Central African Rep. robusta  1991     0.91    2.59 *   2.27  
Ghana robusta  1992     4.37 ***   2.82 *   5.17 *** 
                        
*   Null of unit root rejected at 10% significance; ** 5% significance; *** 1% significance  
1  



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































)  31 
table 6   Adjustment to a one-time change in the world price 
Countries with no price transmission asymmetry 
  Adjustment after  Before reforms  After reforms 
       
6 months  101%  98%  Brazil arabica 
12 months  101%  99% 
6 months  142%  95%  Brazil robusta 
12 months  122%  97% 
6 months  40%  88%  Ethiopia 
12 months  41%  96% 
6 months  25%  88%  Tanzania 
12 months  37%  98% 
6 months    94%  Colombia 
12 months    99% 
6 months  43%  95%  India arabica 
12 months  65%  99% 
6 months  27%  84%  India robusta 
12 months  45%  93% 
6 months  85%  80%  Mexico 
12 months  96%  93% 
6 months  30%  96%  Uganda 
12 months  72%  99% 
6 months    83%  Togo 
12 months    95% 
6 months    55%  Central African 
Republic  12 months    76% 
6 months  42%  66%  Ghana 
12 months  67%  91% 
             32 
table 7   Adjustment to a one-time change in the world price 
Countries with price transmission asymmetry 
                 
  Adjustment after  price decreases  price increases 
    Before reforms  After reforms  Before reforms  After reforms 
                 
           
6 months  6%  103%  1%  87%  Kenya 
12 months  5%  101%  0%  97% 
6 months  48%  62%  44%  28%  Madagascar 
12 months  70%  78%  68%  59% 
6 months    47%    7%  Cameroon 
12 months    70%    48% 































   Figure 1  Producer price shares before and after the reforms 
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APPENDIX A: The coffee market reforms 
Brazil 
Prior to the liberalization in 1990 the Brazilian coffee sector was run by the parastatal 
Instituto Brasileiro do Café (IBC), which was responsible for a vast range of activities: 
setting  minimum  export  prices,  regulating  standards,  supervising  domestic  sales  and 
exports,  purchasing  surplus  coffee  and  administering  stocks.  Most  notably,  the 
government was involved in price stabilization, buying any surplus green coffee from 
millers at a guaranteed minimum price. In 1990 the sector was almost entirely liberalized, 
abolishing minimum prices and placing marketing in the hands of private traders. The 
post reform state involvement in the sector is limited to management and sale of publicly 
owned  stocks,  providing  credit  for  growing,  harvesting  and  processing  and  funding 
coffee research. Both domestic purchasing and exporting are run by the private sector. 
Prices are fully determined by the market. Although private exporters were allowed prior 
to liberalization, entry into the sector increased drastically after the reforms. Over 220 
companies  are  listed  as  exporters,  with  none  exporting  more  than  10%  of  the  total. 
However, there is some indication of increasing collusion among exporters (ITF). 
Colombia 
Colombia is an outstanding example of a coffee sector entirely run by an association of 
producers. The powerful Federación Nacional de Cafeteros de Colombia (FNC) exerts 
major  influence  on  the  functioning  of  the  sector.  The  FNC  is  contracted  by  the 
government  to  implement  coffee  policy  and  its  involvement  in  coffee  marketing  is 
substantial: the FNC sets minimum producer prices, controls purchasing, processing and 
exporting of coffee and provides extension services, support to research and funding of 
infrastructure projects. FNC’s agents handle half of all coffee sales, with the remaining   34 
crop being sold to private traders. In 1996 private exporters accounted for approximately 
60% of all exports, while 40% were handled by the FNC. In addition, the FNC acts as a 
stabilization fund, buying surplus coffee from producers at a guaranteed price, which may 
exceed the world price net of marketing costs. In particular, between 1989 and 1994 
producer  received  artificially  high  administered  prices,  causing  losses  to  the  FNC. 
Unsustainable in the long run, the system was abolished in 1995. Although no radical 
structural changes were made that year, 1995 is taken as the year of the reforms, because 
the high producer prices were suspended, which brought the internal prices closer to the 
world market prices. 
While  the  Colombian  coffee  sector  is  marked  by  high  degree  of  semi 
governmental  intervention,  the  system  seems  to  benefit  the  growers.  Acting  unified, 
Colombian growers managed to get a substantial price premium on the world market and 
can influence the domestic policy to their benefit. Unlike in many other coffee producing 
countries, the system serves the interests of producers, not government bureaucrats or 
influential exporters. 
Ethiopia 
Until 1992 the Ethiopian Coffee Marketing Corporation (ECMC) fully controlled coffee 
marketing, handling 86% of all crop purchases in 1990/91. Growers were committed to 
deliver annual quotas at a fixed price. After the switch in the country’s economic policy 
towards a market based economy, ECMC was divided into two structures: the Ethiopian 
Coffee Purchasing Enterprise (ECPE), which purchases coffee, and the Ethiopian Coffee 
Export Enterprise (ECEE), which handles exports. Both compete with the private sector. 
The reforms facilitated entry of new traders and exporters. Around 75 exporters are now 
active  and  240  hold  an  export  license.  Private  traders  account  for  75%  of  exports,   35 
compared to only 10% prior to 1992. However, the sector remains somewhat regulated, 
with  Coffee  Price  Differential  Setting  Committee  setting  daily  minimum  export 
differentials. 
Kenya 
Similar to the Colombian case, the parastatal coffee regulatory and monitoring 
authority in Kenya (the Coffee Board of Kenya, CBK) is an organization dominated by 
producers  and  serves  their  interests.  CBK’s  board  consists  of  nine  growers  and  four 
government  officials.  Throughout  the  years  CBK  managed  to  get  the  highest  price 
margins for exported coffee and Kenya is considered to be one of the highest quality 
producers  of  arabica  in  the  world.  To  this  date  CBK  remains  in  control  of  licensing 
producers and traders and is involved in marketing and research. Direct involvement in 
marketing is very limited, however. Coffee produced by smallholders is marketed by co 
operatives,  while  the  larger  estates  have  their  own  marketing  channels.  All  coffee  in 
Kenya is sold to licensed traders and exporters at weekly auctions at the Nairobi Coffee 
Exchange.  
Liberalization of the Kenyan coffee sector followed a piecemeal approach. Prior 
to liberalization, growers received payments for their coffee in installments as coffee 
passed through the various stages of processing and marketing. The final price paid to 
producers was based on the average auction price for the season. In 1993 the pricing 
system was changed, and growers began receiving one payment, equaling the actual price 
of  the  coffee  auctioned  less  marketing  costs.  Another  outcome  of  the  liberalization 
process  was  greater  competition  in  coffee  processing.  Prior  to  1994 1995  the  Kenya 
Planter’s Co operative Union (KPCU) carried out all milling of coffee. The monopoly 
ended  when  two  other  mills  were  established.  Finally,  in  1997  the  monopoly  of  the   36 
Kenya Coffee Auctions (partly owned by CBK) to act as broker in coffee auctions ended, 
and the growers were able to choose a private broker, if they wished. Because the pricing 
mechanism can be expected to have a direct impact on the prices received by growers, 
1993 is set as the year of the most important reforms. 
Tanzania 
In Tanzania the liberalization took place in 1994, when private traders were allowed to 
purchase,  process  and  export  coffee.  Prior  to  1994  marketing  was  handled  by  the 
Tanzania Coffee Marketing Board (TCMB) and the government controlled cooperative 
unions.  TCMB  controlled  internal  prices  and  exports.  Farmers  delivered  coffee  to 
primary  societies  at  a  previously  announced  price.  The  cooperative  unions  then 
performed  milling  and  grading  and  brought  coffee  to  TCMB  to  be  sold  to  private 
exporters  through  auctions.  The  proceeds  were  then  passed  back  to  growers  through 
cooperative unions and primary societies, deducting marketing and processing costs at 
each stage. It took at least a year for growers to receive the second portion of the payment 
(Baffes, 2003). Following the liberalization, the market share of private traders in the 
internal  market  changed  from  zero  to  67%,  with  vertically  integrated  exporters 
accounting for almost half of the coffee trade. The share handled by cooperative unions 
and other government organizations fell accordingly from 94% to 33%. (Baffes, 2003). 
While the reforms seem to have created greater competition in the marketing sector upon 
their implementation, in the last couple of years the trend has reversed. In 2000/2001 the 
Coffee  Board  revoked  buying  licenses  of  the  private  traders  to  ensure  that  the 
government guaranteed loans to the cooperative unions get repaid. The ban was extended 
for the 2001/2002 season. The mandatory coffee auction is still in place. The existing tax   37 
system is too complex. The taxes are high and have been increasing in the last couple of 
years, eroding the revenues generated within the sector.  
India 
In the beginning of 1990’s India switched its course from a centrally planned economy 
towards a free market system. Prior to the liberalization of the coffee market, the Coffee 
Board (CB) was in full control of coffee purchasing, processing and exporting. The CB 
ran two auctions: one for the domestic market and one for the export market. Similar to 
the pre reform systems in many other countries, growers were paid in two stages: an 
advance  at  the  delivery  point  and  after  the  coffee  has  been  auctioned.  Given  the 
inefficiencies of the marketing system, this meant that in some cases growers had to wait 
up to two years after the delivery to receive their payment in full. The reforms were 
introduced gradually, starting in 1992 1993 when producers were allowed to market 30% 
of their own crop on the domestic market, with the remaining coffee sold at the CB’s 
auctions.  By  1996  the  CB’s  involvement  in  marketing  ended  completely,  and  coffee 
growers and exporters were free to trade the crop as they chose. Pooling of coffee into 
compulsory auctions had also ended. These changes meant that the producers received 
payment much faster, within days after sale. Coffee can be sold at farm gate to domestic 
agents and exporters. The number of registered exporters increased from approximately 
50  to  almost  100  since early  1990’s.  The  role  of  the  CB  today  is  limited  to  quality 
control, industry regulation, research and other non interventionist functions. 
Mexico 
The liberalization of the Mexican coffee sector took place in 1993, when the Mexican 
Coffee Institute (INMECAFE), previously in charge of managing the ICO quotas, was   38 
replaced by the Mexican Coffee Council. The scope of the government intervention in the 
sector was reduced to promotion of Mexican coffee domestically and internationally and 
providing technical assistance to growers. Coffee is bought from farmers by producer 
organization and private traders, processed and sold to domestic roasters and exporters. In 
1997  there  were  230  exporters,  15  of  which  accounted  for  68%  of  the  total  volume 
exported (ITF, 2002a).   
Uganda 
Until 1992 the exports of coffee from Uganda were fully controlled by the government, 
which acted through the Coffee Marketing Board (CMB) and the official cooperative 
societies. The farmgate prices were fixed. Liberalization of the coffee sector occurred in 
several stages. First, CMB lost the monopoly power over exports, and private traders and 
cooperatives were allowed to export directly. In 1991 a new agency, the Uganda Coffee 
Development Authority (UCDA), was formed with the mandate "to promote and oversee 
the coffee industry by developing research, controlling quality, improving the market and 
to provide for other matters connected therewith"
1. The same year the administered prices 
were replaced by indicative prices. In 1992 the export tax on coffee was removed, but 
was reintroduced in 1994 as a stabilization tax. Since the liberalization the share of CMB 
in coffee exports declined steadily, and full withdrawal took place in 1997/1998. Within 
months after the reforms 18 companies were registered as legal exporters and by 1994/95 
the  number  reached  117.  However,  in  the  following  years  the  number  of  registered 
exporters declined sharply: In the 2000/01 season there were only 22. At the same time, 
the share of top ten firms grew from 71% in 1994/95 to 87% in 2000/01 (ITF, 2002b). 
                                                 
1 UCDA’s webpage: http://www.ugandacoffee.org/   39 
Madagascar 
Madagascar liberalized the coffee sector earlier than other countries. Prior to the 
reforms  the  marketing  and  stabilization  board  Caisse  de  Commercialisation  et  de 
Stabilisation des Prix du Café, de la Vanille et du Girofle (CAVAGI) was in charge of 
negotiating  export  contracts  and  managed  five  state  owned  exporting  firms.  Grower 
prices and marketing margins were fixed at the beginning of each crop year. In 1988 the 
sector was liberalized. The level of taxation was reduced and a large number of buyers 
entered  the  market.  The  number  of  exporters  rose  from  five  to  35.  Since  1996  the 
concentration increased, the exports now being dominated by a few firms (between five 
and ten), all with strong links to multinational trade companies (ICO).  
Togo 
As  in  a  typical  pre reform  marketing  system,  the  parastatal  agency  in  Togo,  OPAT 
(Office  des  Produits  Agricoles  Togolais),  fixed  grower  prices  and  traders’  marketing 
margins and acted as a monopoly exporter. Internal marketing, on the other hand, was 
handled  by  the  private  sector.  Following  the  liberalization  in  1996,  the  role  of  the 
government  in  commodity  marketing  became  confined  to  provision  of  inputs  and 
supporting  establishment  of  farmers’  organizations.  The  monopoly  over  exporting 
activities ended, and new traders and exporters emerged on the market. However, entry 
into exporting remained limited. Four companies dominate the market, accounting for 
approximately 75% of exports (ITF). Internal marketing is carried out by private agents 
and co operatives. 
Angola 
Prior to 1991 Angola’s coffee sector was run by two state marketing boards: Cafangol,   40 
which operated throughout the country, and Uigimex, which was responsible for coffee 
marketing  and  exporting  only  from  Uige  province.  Partial  liberalization  began  in 
1991/1992,  when  private  agents  were  allowed  to  compete  Cafangol  and  Uigimex  by 
buying coffee from farmers. The ICO reports that including the two parastatal agencies 
there are 25 licensed exporters, but five of them handled over 90% of the total exports in 
1998.  There  is  still  substantial  governmental  involvement  in  the  sector.  The  State 
Secretariat  for  Coffee  (Secafé)  regulates  and  oversees  the  coffee  industry,  operating 
through  the  National  Coffee  Institute  (INCA).  The  prices  are  regulated,  with  INCA 
setting the minimum producer prices at the beginning of the coffee season in May. The 
prices can be changed during the year. Clearly, the actual price paid to growers could 
exceed the minimum price, but it appears that only in very few areas of the country 
grower prices are higher than the announced minimum price.   
Cameroon 
Two  marketing  channels  were  operational  in  Cameroon  prior  to  the  reforms.  In  the 
anglophone areas, ONCPB, (Office National de Comercialisation des Produits de Base) 
acted as a marketing board, buying the crop from licensed agents and exporting it. In the 
francophone zones, private agents were allowed to export under the negotiated export 
contracts,  but  ONCBP  fixed  regional  farm  prices  and  marketing  margins.  The 
liberalization  of  the  coffee  sector  was  gradual,  ending  in  complete  elimination  of 
government involvement in the sector. In 1991 state licensing of domestic traders was 
abolished, and private exporters were allowed to export directly. While arabica marketing 
was fully liberalized, the state continued to fix marketing margins for robusta coffee, and 
a stabilization fund was established to control farm prices. The stabilization mechanism 
was dismantled in 1994/95. Immediately following the reforms, the number of exporters   41 
increased drastically from around 60 to over 300, but later declined to around 50, with ten 
firms  exporting  over  70%  of  the  total  (ICO).  No  government  approval  is  needed  to 
become an exporter, a simple statement of existence is sufficient (ITF, 2002c). 
Central African Republic 
The stabilization fund of the Central African Republic was dissolved in 1991 and a new 
agency, the Office for the Regulation of Marketing and Quality Control of Agricultural 
Products (ORCCPA), was formed to oversee coffee marketing. Today the government 
announces indicator prices at the beginning of the harvest season, and producer prices are 
negotiated on the basis of those prices. Grower prices are depressed by high 
transportation costs associated with getting export coffee to the port in Douala in 
Cameroon, which is the closest port to the landlocked Central African Republic. 
Ghana 
As  a  typical  pre reform  state  marketing  board,  the  Ghanaian  COCOBOD  was  fully 
controlling  internal  marketing,  exporting,  grower  prices  and  marketing  margins.  The 
Produce Buying Company (PBC), a subsidiary of the COCOBOD, bought coffee from 
producers  and stored it  in its warehouses after processing, inspection and grading. A 
different division of the COCOBOD, the Cocoa Marketing Company (CMC), handled 
external  marketing.  Following  the  structural  adjustment  programs  in  1992,  the 
government liberalized all internal and external marketing of coffee. Private traders were 
allowed to enter the market, and fixed prices and trading margins were abolished. The 
main functions of the COCOBOD became sector regulation and management of licenses. 
The new marketing chain consists of Commission Agents that buy coffee from farms and   42 
registered  exporters  (the  Licensed  Buying  Companies).  By  1994  46  companies  held 
export licenses (ICO).   43 
APPENDIX B: Calculation of the degree of adjustment 
Initially, when the world price is p
w, the equilibrium domestic price equals γp
w. 
When  the  world  price  changes  by   p
w,  the  new  long term  equilibrium  level  of  the 
domestic price is  ) (
w w p p   + γ . Thus, a full adjustment would require the domestic price 
to change by γ p
w. At t = 0, when the change in the world price occurs, the internal price 
changes by δ p
w. The degree of adjustment is then δ/γ. Note that if δ = γ the degree of 
adjustment is one, meaning that full adjustment occurs immediately following the change 
in the world price. Otherwise, an error correction component is added to the domestic 
price in the following period.  
Note that the cumulative change in the domestic price n periods after the jump in 
the world prices equals the sum of all previous changes in the domestic price plus the 
error correction term  
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At t = 1, the total change in the domestic price equals 
( )
w w w w
t
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0
          (B.3) 
Note  that  γθ θ δ − + ) 1 (   can  be  rewritten  as  ) 1 )( ( θ δ γ γ + − − .  Then,  in 
accordance with (B.2), the total change in p
d at t = 2 equals 
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In the next period, at t = 3, the total change in the domestic price is  
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The degree of adjustment is the total change in the domestic price relative to full 
adjustment, which is γ p
w. Thus, n period after the change in the world price the degree 
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